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Summary 
 
   This research particularly analyzes the globalization strategy of Japanese infrastructure related 
business firms to be subjected by its capability to get awarded for infrastructure projects in the global 
petrochemical industry. It also identifies the key success factor or phenomena for related other 
Japanese firms considering globalization in the field. 
   Japan had long been a growing market and requirements of high quality of products and services 
for many industries, and it is not an exception for infrastructure businesses. Many infrastructure 
related business firms had benefited from its stable and relatively large size of home market; 
therefore it was not mandatory for them to expand business for overseas markets. However, the 
external environments had radically changed over the past decades after the collapse of a bubble 
economy in the 90s and global financial crisis in 2008. Suffering from the economical long term 
downturn in the matured domestic market, the Japanese infrastructure firms have struggled to win 
overseas projects including petrochemical related plants, power stations and desalination plants etc. 
in emerging markets where demands are still growing. It is believed that Japanese firms have high 
potentials for leveraging their technologies and products in the global market.  
 
  
   Yet the reality is quite different and the market has already been competitive by emerging 
competitors. Korean general constructions firms have been very active in such market and Chinese 
equipment manufacturers are already listed on the vendor list in some countries where Japanese 
firms long been thought the stronghold for them. It is one of characteristics of the industry where a 
simple project or a simple product exports require a large number of labors not only in home country 
but also in local country. In the petrochemical infrastructure market, there are various other reasons 
for potential Japanese firms finding difficulties to be competitive. The difference between Japanese 
industry standard is just one example. Some Japanese firms have overcome these problems and been 
aggressive in the emerging markets. Thus it is important to understand the factors causing Japanese 
firms to be successful in those markets. 
   By taking data for the petrochemical sector, this study statistically analyzed the factors which 
influence the number of project awards in foreign countries. The outcome implies that, in 
petrochemical industry, firms should have a clear regional strategy whereas localization in terms of 
human resources is not important. Domestic based resources and capabilities of firms are required to 
succeed in the global market but aggressiveness is more important. Forming alliances with 
appropriate partners leads to winning successful project awards. Therefore Japanese firms should 
understand the effective way to enter overseas markets and leverage the resources, capabilities and 
technologies they have. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The demands of investment on the infrastructure business around the globe increased 
significantly in the past two decades. Its market size was about four-hundred billion USD in 2000 
and has still been increasing rapidly. This is caused by many factors; the market in the developed 
countries became saturated whereas many emerging markets in developing countries are still 
growing, emerging competitors from developing countries gained capabilities etc. Therefore 
Japanese construction firms had necessities for entering global market and winning project awards in 
order to increase their revenues and to sustain their growth. Some statistical data shows that in terms 
of the occupied market size of infrastructure business, South Korean firms are not as much in the 
dominant positions as heard in the media in any region except Middle East market where they 
aggressively participated in the biddings of many national projects. Chinese construction firms show 
the strong presence in almost all developing regions. Among all these increasing in intensive 
competition, it seems that Japanese firms are losing its home owned competitive advantage in most 
regions, only with the exception in Asian countries, in spite of the fact that they have competitive 
advanced technology ,knowhow, and accumulated experiences. 
The research objective is to focus on the global strategy of Japanese construction firms in 
petrochemical industry to examine how they become globalized in particular in emerging markets, as 
well as developed markets. In this study, two processes of global strategy were considered, 
localization and cross border alliances, as these two were believed to be important global strategies 
in labor intensive industry. Here are three research questions. 
RQ 1: How important for successful Japanese firms to implement localization process and regional 
diversification strategy? 
RQ 2: Is competitive advantage in the domestic market more important or firms having 
aggressiveness to enter foreign markets more important? 
RQ 3: How do successful Japanese firms choose partnership in which form of entering overseas 
markets? 
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These research questions yield some hypotheses such that firms having greater localization, 
greater capabilities and good strategic alliance policies would have more successful winning project 
awards. They are described in later chapter in detail. 
Detailed information of each infrastructure project is strictly confidential and not available in 
public. The study is based on the available data of Japanese construction firms which experienced 
the winning awards in the year between 2009 and 2013. Statistical approach, negative binominal 
correlation analysis is implemented accordance with the data acquired. From this study, firms in 
related industries may understand the behaviors and globalization process that imply some 
tendencies for winning successful projects award in oversea markets. 
Chapter 1 is the introduction of the study describing the overall study briefly. Chapter 2 
describes the history of Japanese construction firms and overall view of the industry. The Chapter 
particularly focuses on key crucial historical events in Japanese construction industry, industrial 
characteristics and structure, project management and specific standards in petrochemical industry. 
Chapter 3 provides some classical and modern ideas and arguments on studies by others. The chapter 
is divided into three parts, global strategy in general, localization, and cross border alliances. Based 
on these global strategy theories, some hypotheses are outcomes. Chapter 4 describes the analytical 
method of acquired data and analytical methods implemented according to each research question. 
Chapter 5 is the description of outcomes of statistical analysis described in the previous chapter. 
Then it brings some implications with regards to the research questions. Chapter 6 brings further 
discussion explaining the possible reasons where hypotheses are not evidently supported. Then it 
provides further implication for both practice and academic sides. Chapter 7 is the overall 
conclusion.  
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CHAPTER 2. INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRY 
Section 1. GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRY 
The demands of investment on the infrastructure business around the globe increased 
significantly in the past two decades. Its market size was about four-hundred billion USD in 2000 
and has been increasing with the amount of ninety billion USD on average each year, surpassing in 
trillion USD in 2009. During the 90s, roughly a quarter of the investment was accounted for overseas 
projects whereas about forty percent of the total investment was spent for oversea project after 2010 
(see Graph 1). This is caused by many factors; the market in the developed countries became 
saturated whereas many emerging markets in developing countries are still growing, emerging 
competitors from developing countries gained capabilities, in particular in natural resources based 
industry, discovery of new type of resources changed the demand and supply balance in the global 
market. Therefore Japanese construction firms had necessities for entering global market and 
winning project awards in order to increase their revenues and to sustain their growth. 
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Some statistical data shows that the size of the market of infrastructure business that includes 
fields of transportations, petroleum, building, power, water sectors, is distributed moderately in each 
region (see Table 1). Among them, Europe is the biggest market and Asia, Middle East, Africa etc. 
Not surprising that nearly half of the European market is dominated by European construction firms 
but also in the African, South American and Caribbean market. In term of the occupied market size, 
South Korean firms are not as much in the dominant positions as heard in the media in any region 
except Middle East market where they aggressively participated in the biddings of many national 
projects by creating strong network in regions and relationships with local governments. Chinese 
construction firms show the strong presence, other than Europe and North America, in almost all 
developing regions. Among all these increasing in intensive competition, it seems that Japanese 
firms are losing its home owned competitive advantage in most regions, only with the exception in 
Asian countries including its home market. This is strongly influenced by the legacy of the 
globalization of Japanese infrastructure firms more than a half century ago, as will be discussed in 
the next section. 
T able 1: R egional Market S truc ture, 2010 (Unit: b illion  US D)
C ontrac tors E urope N. A meric a As ia M. E as t
S . Amer ica &
C aribbean
Afric a
F ranc e 211 50 - - - 59
S pain 156 - - - 108 -
G ermany 61 96 168 - - -
Italy 24 - - 54 61 100
US A - 96 97 117 35 -
J apan 4 19 78 42 5 8
S . K orea - 5 36 111 7 22
C hina 24 4 174 100 33 235
Others 485 187 213 299 91 182
T otal 941 457 766 723 340 606
Adapted by author, 
S ourc e: The Min is try of E c ono my, Trade an d In dus try of J apan , 
“P res ent S ituation o f E x portin g In fras truc ture S ys tem (2012)”
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Section 2. GLOBALIZATION OF JAPANESE CONSTRUCTION FIRMS 
This section provides a summary of history of Japanese construction firms going global 
based on the book published by Overseas Construction Association of Japan Inc. (OCAJI 2007). 
Some important topics are selected and each paragraph is divided accordance with the timeline, 
pre-WWII, first project after WWII, and approximately each decade. 
Prior to WW II, the first infrastructure project executed by Japanese construction firms is the 
railway in Korean peninsula at the end of nineteen century. A few years later, another railway project 
was executed in Taiwan. Several other projects including hydraulic power stations, mining, airports 
etc. was executed in many counties, such as the mainland of China, Vietnam, Thailand, Mexico, and 
Brazil until the end of WW II. However, the globalization of the construction firms at this time had 
different characteristics from the one seen nowadays, and was closely related to incidents and wars 
such that the purchasers are usually governmental institutions controlled by Japanese imperial 
military. All those oversea business had experienced tough situation in isolated environment in many 
geographically diversified areas and had finally turned into none as their assets at local were all 
confiscated by local governments at the end of the war, yet the survived engineers in some firms 
preserved the technologies. 
After WW II, as the Japanese economy had started recovering from the barren and 
impoverished condition of postwar period, the construction industry became relatively stable. The 
first oversea project after the war was the U.S. military base in Okinawa Island. This project was an 
opportunity for all Japanese engineers to learn about more advanced modern construction machines 
rented by the U.S. forces. Japanese firms also learned about American contract forms which made 
the execution management more rational and convenient. This project was a particularly remarkable 
in the Japanese construction history because this was the first project that Japanese firms 
experienced in the form of a joint venture (also known as a “consortium”) where four American 
parties and three Japanese parties were involved. This historical event implies a key idea regarding 
RQ 3. 
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In general, the globalization of Japanese firms activities can be categorized into four phases, 
each accompanied with a crucial event in the external environment (see Graph 2). The first phase 
began after the World War II as a part of its compensation liability for those countries in South East 
Asia in order to rebuild the political relationships between them. Therefore the majority, around 
seventy percent, of their work was focused on the basic hard infrastructures in public sectors in those 
counties including Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore etc. but also includes Japanese domestic 
market (see Graph 3). Japanese firms did not face any competitions in these countries as all 
payments were guaranteed by Japanese government. At that time, firms simply operated from the 
head offices in their home countries instead of establishing their own subsidiaries.  Compared to the 
size of the home market, the overseas projects were still minor. Therefore many firms focused on the 
domestic market and eventually led to a lack of information of foreign competitors. Therefore 
regarding RQ 2, aggressiveness of firms is influenced by domestic market. 
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The second phase began during the 70s accompanied by the oil shock leading an increase of 
numbers of projects in the Middle East region. During these years, the energy resource in Japan was 
highly depended on the imported crude oil from the Middle East. This event made Japanese 
construction firms to recognize that all construction materials in the domestic market had soared 
dramatically and they had to support the infrastructure development in the Middle East. In order to 
increase the total output capacity and efficiency of the refineries, the size of each project became 
large. This phenomenon was also seen in the other infrastructures projects in the Middle East. 
American and European competitors were already participating in this market actively, by utilizing 
the historical relationships with local governments and supports from many consultants. South 
Korean government established KOCC, the national enterprise specialized in overseas construction 
projects, focusing on the Saudi Arabian market. In contrast, Japan was struggling with a lack of a 
system for such large amount of financial investments, warrants, export insurances, and management 
and policy of foreign exchange. Overall activity of Japanese firms in the Middle East became 
temporarily, most of them still operated from their home countries. Political instability and turmoil in 
some countries such as Iran were the major causes. Again regarding RQ 1, firms did not consider 
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localization process within the competition.  
In the third phase during the middle of 80s, after the Plaza Accord in 1985, Japan entered into 
bubble economy. Prior to this event, total overseas projects awarded by Japanese firms exceeded one 
trillion JPN (see Graph 3), shifting the main market from the Middle East to Asia. They had already 
built high reputations in many countries, attributed from integrity regarding the contract, compliance 
with the lead time, reliable high technologies and qualities. All these factors gave them an 
international competitive advantage. Thereafter Japanese firms aggressively entered North American 
market and as a result they award many projects in the USA increasing their total sales dramatically 
(see Graph 3). Their subsidiaries drove the majority of the total revenue during this period as the 
headquarters operation focused on the public sectors whereas their subsidiaries were majored in the 
public sectors and those project initiated by Japanese-American firms. These satisfactorily activities 
led to another remarkable event during this era. The domestic market became open to foreign 
construction firms as the Japanese government was under severe pressure of the trade conflict 
between Japan and America. In order to compensate the change in the domestic market conditions, 
Japanese firms continuously went abroad seeking market opportunities. During this period, the 
characteristics of globalization of Japanese firms differed from each other depending on the 
countries where they could utilize the accumulated know-how, technologies in certain fields and 
human networks etc. In this phase, forming a joint venture for large projects became a common 
process. Therefore, regarding to RQ 2, home based resources, capability and accumulated 
experiences are important for firms going oversea markets. Regarding RQ 3, if firms do not have 
enough resource and capability, they should consider strategic alliances in some forms. 
The fourth phase occurred in the late 90s after the collapse of a bubble economy in Japan 
followed by an Asian currency crisis and global financial crisis in 2008. These events slowed down 
both activities in head offices and subsidiaries but also it began for some firms where the 
performance of the subsidiaries in certain countries like USA, Indonesia, Malaysia became superior 
to their own home market. Ever since, all firms have been willing to enter the international markets 
especially those ones in emerging countries. Although Japanese firms perceived the importance of 
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the market in the Middle East and African regions, their activities remained cautious due to the 
country risks and political instabilities. As may hear from media, regarding RQ 1, localization may 
be the key strategy for firms to be more successful in oversea markets. 
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Section 3. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
This section describes the characteristics of the infrastructure industry, risks of global 
projects in general and provides the basic concepts of risk reduction. Then it provides information 
about current competition in the industry and describes the emerging competitors. At the end of this 
section, it describes a brief history of standards in petrochemical industry and focuses on the 
presence of particular standards. 
The value chain of infrastructure business can be divided into several categories and usually 
defined as the following: Feasibility Study (FS), Front-end Engineering Design (FEED), Quotation 
& Bid, Contract Award, Engineering, Procurement, Construction, Commissioning, Take Over, and 
Operation & Maintenance (see the top part of Figure 1). It is also reasonable to divide into two 
category where prior to the real construction begins, in this case till Contract Award, is called the 
upstream of the project and the subsequent part is called the downstream of the project. Usually, 
associated local government or national enterprise handle the whole project progress and they are in 
charge of approvals of each package of projects award. 
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There is a relationship that firm having a smaller liability have a small profitability (see the 
bottom part of Figure 1). Here the exporters are only to be involved within the procurement stage 
and may obtain relatively small margin together with small risks. EPC contractors are involved with 
engineering, procurement and construction stage, and may obtain moderate level of margin but 
greater risks. There is a total solution-type firms that are capable of managing the entire value chain 
activities and try to maximize their opportunity for profitability but are willing to accept much 
higher level of risks (they also known as a project type BOT, Build Operate Transfer, therefore BOT 
contractor). Historically Japanese firms begun their infrastructure business as equipment exporters 
taking their strong advantage of quality and advanced technologies and later some heavy industry 
firms entered as EPC contractors. Regarding RQ 2, such home based capability could motivate firms 
to enter overseas markets more aggressively. 
However, in Japan, there is no firm with high reputation in managing the entire value chain 
providing the total solution for the customers.  BOT contracts became a common project type in 
developing countries at the late eighty’s. Remarkably, in contrast, there are many Korean contractors 
who are capable of taking such activities and have been running their business for decades. The 
absence of Japanese firms as BOT contractors is mainly because of a lack of know-how and 
operational management skills within them. It implies that Japanese firms have extensively been 
losing the scope of work with much higher profitability. However, in general, it is practically 
difficult to reduce the risk that may arise from the activities through the entire project. Regarding RQ 
3, firms may choose to form strategic alliances to reduce their own risks. 
In almost every industry, risks of any projects in global scale may be attributed to, in general, 
all forthcoming contingency events. There are two types of risks; the first one is called unavoidable 
risks (sometimes it is called force majeure) such as political turnover and natural disasters. The 
second type is called controllable risks that are all attributed to commercial activities. The latter type 
of risk is the core subject when implementing the global projects, thereafter the rest of this section 
will refer this type. There are several types of controllable risk and countermeasures have to be 
considered. Here examples of typical controllable risks are introduced accompanied with each stage 
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of projects, financial issues at the contract, the access problems at construction, and price policy at 
the operation stage. 
One common item for all global projects is fluctuating currency exchange rate. It may 
become a serious matter if a loan from local banks and the revenue uses different currency so it is 
highly desirable to have the consistency of currency through the whole contract. By utilizing 
international financial institutions and other related capital market for the capital procurement 
provide stable resources with better terms and conditions when needed. Selecting appropriate 
partners is perhaps the most important issue unless the firm has all required capabilities in such way 
that they can deal with the entire process without having the support from local subcontractors, local 
suppliers, lawyers, consultants etc. At the execution stage, risks of the access to the critical location 
have to be considered. This usually includes the access to the site for the materials and human 
resources by appropriate transportation, where it is usually isolated from the modern technology. 
Implementing the site survey beforehand could reveal all such risks hence could significantly reduce 
the risk of the whole project becoming delayed. Finally, at the operational stage, firms should 
confirm that local government would guarantee the minimum required demand for the operation. 
Firms should dispatch their own research team to the site with the support from specialists to 
estimate the demand. When establishing the price system, it is highly desirable that the operator is 
viable to change the price flexibly, regarding the inflationary economy and macro economical factors. 
Regarding RQ 3, firms are recommended to create a partnership with others who already have 
experiences and know-how when contingency events occur. 
Not only during the execution stage of the project, but collaboration with other firms, that 
includes both domestic and foreign firms, and trading firms in a variety of types, is common in 
infrastructure business nowadays. Japanese firms with risk-averse attitude prefer collaborating with 
other Japanese firms by forming a consortium with one trading company as a whole project manager. 
For further details, please refer to section 3-3. Since any infrastructure project requires a long range 
of time span, usually more than ten years, and tremendous amount of financial resources which 
sometimes becomes over billion dollar project, it is desirable to minimize the risks of uncertain 
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events.  
The main difference between forms of a joint venture and a consortium is the profit 
distribution. For a joint venture project, overall profit will be distributed to all participated parties 
based on the fixed ratio agreed in the contract. In this way, all parties could avoid conflicts of interest 
between them; however, it requires huge effort and time for coordination and decision making. On 
the other hand, a consortium type project, each party takes the responsibility for the scope of works 
and budgets so that prompt response and execution is possible. But if work allocation is 
inappropriately implemented or problems accompanied with additional cost is not noticed, it often 
leads to conflict of interests. Risk management may be a systematic process and the project manager 
should be able to understand and apply such processes. Several generalized analytical tools for risk 
management already exist and they include risk identification process, both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis to control the cost, schedule, scope and quality etc. Therefore with regards to 
RQ 3, firms forming strategic alliances would possess, at least, the capability to deal with the 
allocated works accompanied with smaller risks. Then the form of alliance and selection of 
partnership becomes the key issue. 
In the late 90s, Japanese construction firms experienced tough competition among all other 
multinational firms but usually recognized as one of most active and aggressive organizations going 
abroad. This can clearly be indicated by their total revenues reported in these years and they were 
always ranked within the top in regions all over the world, Asia, Middle East, Africa etc. This trend 
of industrial growth has dramatically changed in the past decade. The following table is the latest 
ranking of the top international contractors announced in 2014 (see Table 2). The top five positions 
are still dominated by European and American firms, Groupo ACS, HOCHTIEF AG, Bechtel, VINCI 
and Fluor Corp.; however, Japanese firms had lost the strong force that they used to have. Even 
though JGC, the top Japanese firm on the list, has been improving its financial performance in the 
past few years, by restructuring the operational process due to the economic impact in 2008, the 
massive earthquake in 2011 and the influences of strong Japanese currency; they are losing its 
competitiveness against other rivals in the global scale. However, regarding RQ 2, JGC seems to  
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Rank Firm Country
International
Revenue ($mil.)
1 Grupo ACS  Spain 44,053.80
2 HOCHTIEF AG  Germany 34,845.00
3 Bechtel  U.S.A. 23,637.00
4 VINCI  France 20,292.60
5 Fluor Corp.  U.S.A. 16,784.30
9 China Communications Construction Group Ltd.  China 13,162.50
12 Construtora Norberto Odebrecht  Brazil 9 ,877.10
13 Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd.  S. Korea 8,707.80
15 Samsung Engineering Co. Ltd.  S. Korea 7,132.50
17 Samsung C&T Corp.  S. Korea 6,308.00
20 China State Construction Engineering Corp.  China 5,742.70
23 Sinohydro Group Ltd.  China 5,314.40
25 China National Machinery Industry Corp.  China 5,288.90
27 JGC Corp.  Japan 4,822.00
28 China Railway Group Ltd.  China 4,766.90
29 GS Engineering & Construction Corp.  S. Korea 4,713.40
30 Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd.  S. Korea 4,381.30
39 China Railway Construction Corp. Ltd.  China 3,486.00
43 SK Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd.  S. Korea 3,051.40
44 Chiyoda Corp.  Japan 2,957.70
45 Obayashi Corp.  Japan 2,889.00
46 CITIC Construction Co. Ltd.  China 2,830.90
47 Larsen & Toubro Ltd.  India 2,786.70
49 Daewoo E&C Co. Ltd.  S. Korea 2,759.90
51 China Gezhouba Group Co. Ltd.  China 2,532.70
52 ENKA Construction & Industry Co. Inc.  Turkey 2,398.80
53 Renaissance Construction  Turkey 2,391.10
54 Kajima Corp.  Japan 2,386.80
57 POSCO Engineering & Construction  S. Korea 2,373.20
58 SEPCOIII Electric Power Construction Corp.  China 2,356.30
63 China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau (CPP)  China 2,114.00
64 Shanghai Electric Group Co. Ltd.  China 2,105.50
68 China Metallurgical Group Corp.  China 1,945.00
70 Toyo Engineering Corp.  Japan 1,884.70
71 China Civil Engineering Constr. Corp.  China 1,879.50
73 Hanwha Engineering & Construction Corp.  S. Korea 1,648.70
75 Shimizu Corp.  Japan 1,580.70
76 China Petroleum Eng’g & Construction Corp.  China 1,576.60
77 Construtora Andrade Gutierrez SA  Brazil 1 ,571.70
79 Dongfang Electric Corp.  China 1,480.40
82 China National Chemical Engineering Group  China 1,315.50
83 TAV Construction  Turkey 1,268.30
84 China Int’l Water & Electric Corp. (CWE)  China 1,266.20
85 China General Technology (Group) Holding Ltd.  China 1,123.60
86 Polimeks Insaat Taahhut ve San Tic. AS  Turkey 1,252.10
88 Takenaka Corp.  Japan 1,236.50
89 Sinopec Engineering (Group) Co. Ltd.  China 1,153.20
90 Taisei Corp.  Japan 1,150.00
91 Taikisha Ltd.  Japan 1,109.70
92 Punj Lloyd Ltd.  India 1,089.00
93 CGC Overseas Construction Group Co. Ltd.  China 1,057.50
94 OAS SA  Brazil 1 ,020.00
97 Penta-Ocean Construction Co. Ltd.  Japan 952.3
98 Qingjian Group Co. Ltd.  China 945
99 Arabian Construction Co. SAL  Lebanon 937.6
         Table 2: Top International Contractors 2014
Adapted by author, source:
ENR , (2014) . “Top 300 International  Contractors  2014”.
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have home based capability to enter international competition. As shown in the table, there are many 
newly emerging competitors from developing countries that are almost dominating the rest of the top 
hundred ranking position.  
In terms of international revenue, some firms had achieved remarkable growth just within the 
past three years. Chinese construction firms have long been aggressively participating in many kinds 
of infrastructure projects in the region of Asia and Africa. More surprisingly, the presence of Chinese 
firms is also increasing in the Middle East region where Japanese firms have long had a stronghold. 
There are two types of project in term of technologies, for an example, in transportation 
infrastructure business, low technology type such as highway project, and high technology such as 
airport. Chinese contractors are widely accepted in both types such that they are already listed on the 
vendor list in some countries. Construtora Norberto Odebrecht, one of the Brazilian construction 
firms, has already surpassed all other Koreans which thought to be major Japanese competitors in the 
past few years; and has been seeking an opportunity to become at the dominant global position. 
Larsen & Toubro Ltd., an Indian construction firm, ENKA Construction & Industry Co. Inc. and 
Renaissance Construction, both are Turkish construction firms, have also attained the same 
competitiveness as other Japanese firms. Regarding RQ 2, these emerging competitors may have 
resources and capabilities, as well as aggressiveness to enter any regions around the globe.  
This is an absolutely chaotic situation for Japanese firms where they have been struggling 
with for many years trying to discover the solution to increase competitiveness again. Information 
seen in the public these days often indicates that Japanese government should play a key role in 
project progression and take the initiative to control the operation management among all those 
Japanese participating private firms for public-private partnership and optimize the output of the 
demanded construction facility by utilizing the high technology that Japanese firms possess. Yet the 
practice is much harder that being said. Because Japanese culture is more likely to have consensus 
oriented decision making processes, involving a large number of parties which is common in the 
global scale projects, which leads to slow responses when communicating with the opponent. In 
contrast to Japanese firms that have higher cost, emerging firms have cost advantage which is one 
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major factor of that help them to win international biddings. Other reason is that those emerging 
firms have typically integrated the horizontal value chain activities so that prompt response enables 
emerging firms to convince the local government that specifications satisfy all requirements. 
Together with the financial supports from the home country government, the consequence is that 
these emerging firms participate into infrastructure projects without much concern of taking high 
risks of the uncertainties. Regarding to RQ 2, this would further spur the aggressiveness of emerging 
firms to be competitive international bidders. 
The following is a brief history of standards in petrochemical industry and focuses on the 
presence of particular API standards established by American Petroleum Institutions (API), leading 
to one of important assumption in this study, which will be stated in Chapter 4. Establishing 
standards are an essential process as it provides rigorous and important technical references for 
entire activities of the firms not only limited to the oil and gas industry but any kinds, regardless of 
the level of the standards applicable to national, regional and international projects. For global sized 
projects, excellent standards for all related areas facilitate such implementations trouble-free in an 
increasingly complexity in petrochemical industry. This is one of the characteristics in natural 
resource-based industry. The depletion of the resources is the major issue. Any businesses involved 
in the oil and gas industry is very capital intensive accompanied with high risks, therefore in order to 
keep increasing output; firms have to improve exploration, extraction and refining technologies. This 
yielded the diversified and complicated system of standards in the global oil and gas industry, 
including firm’s own project specifications. The investigation done by one of European 
organizations in 1994 revealed that nearly two thousand standards were in use by a number of 
operators in Europe only. Those regulations for the oil and gas industry were historically set by 
national regulators, without consideration of international applications. It unconsciously led to 
differences in regulations with wide variations across the regions reflecting diversified environments 
and backgrounds. One new regulation is usually referred by existing one so some regulated items are 
quite similar to each other. With a large effort and capital investment, some standards became more 
common with more sophisticated contents to develop consistency in technical requirements on a 
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global basis with the necessary national adaptations to the prevailing conditions at the operation sites. 
Hence few standards became widely acceptable in the global projects.  
The American Petroleum Institute (API) is a one of the leading standards in the development 
of petroleum, including the primary and secondary products; and petrochemical facilities and their 
operating standards covers a wide range of areas including oil extraction process, refining process, 
equipment specifications etc. Because it enables the engineering and operating practices to be safe, 
interchangeable for equipment and materials, many governments and national enterprises have been 
integrated into their regulations and adopted by ISO for worldwide acceptance. In such a 
complicated petrochemical industry and works involved in related fields, API provides two 
important implications which are beneficial for involved parties. First, regardless of the amount of 
required effort to understand the whole concepts, specifications could facilitate communications 
between all stakeholders majorly including purchasers and manufacturers in both upstream and 
downstream activities. Second, these standards also facilitate communications with related industry 
which mainly includes the secondary products, as a proven industry practices for firms 
understanding common API practices. Therefore firms are usually being asked to submit their 
experience records whether they have managed to construct the facilities or equipment complying 
with the required standards. API Standards combine components of both specifications and 
recommended practices, and it is intended for adoption by regulatory agencies or authorities having 
jurisdiction. Formatting bulletins and technical reports deliver technical information on a specific 
subject or topic. According to the investigation and its result referred in the “Regulators ‘use of 
standard” published by The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers in 2010, API has been 
most referenced by national regulators around the globe. It came to the conclusion stating that: 
 
“Standards provides for clear and known references for parts, equipment, systems 
and facilities of this complex industry. With this recognition comes the responsibility 
for the oil and gas industry, regulators included, to maintain and develop a suitable 
package of standards for the continued efficiency of the global oil and gas industry” 
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This indicates that the global petrochemical industry has a tendency of converging towards a 
certain global standards. 
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES 
Section 1. GLOBAL STRATEGY 
All industries have the potential to be globalized such that, nowadays, it is hard to find one 
that is completely isolated and kept within the domestic activities. To some extent, all industries are 
partially influenced by global activities and global firms always attempt to integrate the whole 
market (Levitt 1983). The potential of the industrial globalization is affected by four forces; market, 
cost, government, and competitive (see Figure 2). The market force is determined by the consumer 
behaviors. The force generally includes emerging of globalized supply chain activities as well as IT 
revolution and global branding. The cost force is determined by the profitability of the business 
domain. This includes the pressure to pursue the scale and scope of economies, lower labor cost, and 
global logistics. These would affect the decision making for the production site, market selection and 
global research and development (R&D). The government force is simply determined by the 
governments in each country. The policy includes lowering tariff and trade barriers, deregulations, 
and privatizations. Participating in the regional trade agreements is particularly seen in media these 
days. The competitive force is strongly determined by the rivalry and it spurs the need for global 
strategy of each firm. The force includes globalized finance system, global alliances and increasing 
in the number of emerging markets. 
There is much research on globalization process regarding its strategy and organization 
growth. The sequence of the globalization process usually begins with exporting, direct sales, 
overseas productions; and at the later stage, marketing, designing and R&D functions would be 
transferred (Dunning 1993). The studies by Dunning (1993) led to develop the concept of OLI 
framework, Ownership, Location and Internalization specific advantages, explaining the possible 
reasons why firms gain advantage as they go globalized. These include the multi-nationality 
organizational and risk diversification theories (Kogut 1985, Rangan 1998), resource based theory 
approach (Conner & Prahalad 1996), and others. Global firms usually possess the management 
capability to control the complex organization. To penetrate the market, firms have to establish their  
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Figure 2: Forces Causing Industrial Globalization
Source: Kotabe, M. & Helsen, K. (2008). 
“Global Marketing Management – 4th Edition”
 
own local offices. Firms can manage the local business and interact with local human resources 
which may be completely different from those in their home markets. Prudent managers perceive the 
above forces (see Figure 2) to realize the global market as one market and try to develop a system 
having a global integration to create scales and scopes of economy, and local responsiveness 
simultaneously (Bartlett & Ghoshal 1989). However, in practice, it is difficult to attain both cost 
leadership and differentiation strategies, and they are classically defined as a trade-off relation 
(Porter 1980). Some studies had developed more sophisticated concepts to overcome such a trade-off 
problem in the global market. The practically applicable idea in emerging markets is that firms adapt 
their products or services by a vertical differentiation strategy.  Eliminating and/or downgrading the 
functions of products or services enable them to be competitive in some countries where the majority 
of consumers demand simpler items than those ones served in developed countries (Kim & 
Mauborgne 2005). Because the world is not as flat as it was thought; the cross-border integration of 
activities is at a much lower level than was expected (Ghemawat 2003). His study explicitly suggests 
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not all the integration that is required to add value across borders need to occur within single 
organization. By introducing additional dimension, arbitrage, to the Porter’s work (1980), 
aggregation and adaptation, it is possible for firms to overcome the trade-off relation, in which they 
usually attain from one of them and ultimately for all at the later stage (Ghemawat 2007). 
 
Although a large investment in production reduces the cost and builds an entry barrier against 
other new entrants, there is no guarantee that the firm could permanently sustain the cost advantage 
in the dynamics of the global market. In natural resource related industries, the major players 
experienced horizontal integration through the value chain after the Second World War. However, 
they became more privatized or the entire value chain was broken into pieces such that more players 
had entered. The Herfindahl Index indicates an increase in producers and refiners between the 50s 
and the 70s (Ghemawat 2000). Of course, this result cannot be criticized by a simple statistical 
analysis. As more new natural resource fields were discovered as the exploration technologies have 
improved, there is an increase in number of players. Although in emerging markets, many of them 
are still horizontally integrated and nationalized. Firms may achieve better performance if they take 
diversification strategies in emerging markets such that each business domain could reduce the risks 
arise from uncertainties in the market (Khanna & Palepu 1997). Natural resource based industries in 
countries like OPEC, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, were particularly 
influenced by their political activities. There always exist some differences between developed 
market and emerging markets. Firms should understand those differences or sometimes absence of 
materials; in a large scale, this is called institutional voids. The idea implies that firms should adapt 
their home developed strategy to specific selected markets or stay away from it (Khanna 2005). 
When firms face a situation that they do not find appropriate human resources, they should not 
hesitate to invest and to spend time for educating locals with appropriate ethical standards and 
respect (Meyer 2004). 
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Section 2. GLOBALIZATION 
For Japanese construction firms, the localization of subsidiaries began more active at the end 
of the 70s. Investment and financing for infrastructure projects in developing countries majorly 
depended on foreigners and the capital needed to flow inwards efficiently. Local governments set 
strict conditions for the international biddings, for examples, prioritizing local firms as purchasers, 
establishing a joint venture became a necessity, and sometimes political protections for the infant 
industry, so that those local firms could gain competitiveness. Firms newly entering to these 
countries had to learn the complexity of cross border direct investment (Bartlett & Ghoshal 1989). 
Many foreign firms were welcomed to retain their activities in local markets by establishing 
subsidiaries and branches. In particular, local procurements were desired as it stimulated the entire 
national economy. This led local firms to increase their capabilities by upgrading the corporate 
management and human resource management, developing related industries, knowledge diffusions 
etc. The demands by local firms may differ from each country. Therefore, applying a regionally 
fragmented strategy can create more value than a single global one (Ghemawat 2005). He also states 
that: 
 
“Without a clear sense of how a regional structure is supposed to add value, it is 
impossible to specify what the structure should try to achieve. A company with no 
regional HQs may still use regions as the building blocks of its overall strategy, and a 
company with many regional HQs may still not have a clearly articulated regional 
strategy. In other words, having regional headquarters doesn’t mean that you actually 
have a regional strategy” 
 
In fact, most multinational enterprises had never been passive against local government 
policies. Lobbying activities to both home and the local governments create tremendous advantage 
for firms and it sometimes overturns industrial policies. Employing local personnel as the top 
managers in local subsidiaries may take the advantage of having direct connections to key 
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governmental institutions. Interestingly, a comment made by Mr. Gothlin, CEO of Accenture 
Consulting, in one of the article stated that, 
 
“Many Japanese multinational enterprises, which actively entered foreign markets 
during the 80s, have well-structured and sophisticated global organizations and 
leaders. However, those firms became globalized during 90s usually take important 
decision processes in head offices and dispatch some expatriates to manage the local 
organizations. In order to pursue the real globalization, it is clear that these kinds of 
organizations are inappropriate. The key solution is to provide local manager with 
authority and responsibility. Good examples can be found in LG, South Korean 
electronics firm, in India, or the acquired British automobile firm Jaguar by Indian 
firm, Tata Motors. Typically, Asian firm cultures tend to protect the centralized 
decision making process, but fostering local leaders with some respect is inevitable to 
gain capability for rapid response against local needs, and to sustain competitiveness 
in the global market.”(translated by author, from Japanese) 
 
This implies that localization process is important for any firms and it influences the financial 
performance in the long term. Japanese headquarters’ trusts for local manager and employees lead 
Japanese firms to provide autonomies with responsibilities, information and other resources. In 
practice, it is difficult for firms to explore markets where they have never been. At the beginning of 
the globalization stage, firms tend to invest in foreign markets that are geographically close to their 
home market and then later they begin to invest in further markets. Classically this is described as 
psychological distance (Johanson 1990) and also improved to more sophisticated concepts of four 
distances; cultural, administrative, geographical and economical distances (Ghemawat 2001). 
However, once the firms overcome this problem, it increases the morale of the locals and may result 
in higher performance.  
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The statement and argument above leads to the following hypotheses (refer to Figure 3). 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): If firms are more localized in terms of human resources, they are more likely to 
receive project awards. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): If firms have longer local activities, they are more likely to receive project 
awards. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): To some extent, if firms establish more regional branches, they are more likely 
to receive the project awards. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): If firms have a high ratio of foreign to domestic revenues, they are more likely 
to receive project awards. 
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Section 3. CROSS BORDER ALLIANCES 
Strategic alliance combines two or more firms having mutual benefits to achieve an 
important goal. This is a common process in technology intensive industry where no firm owns all 
the latest technologies. Firms are recommended to use alliances selectively to gain the advantage of 
foreign enterprises hedging against risk, provided that they still create the competitive advantage at 
their home countries (Porter 1990). They have to select some countries or markets as an entering 
target and they usually have to make an alliance with some firms who have the experience and local 
knowledge. In general, international joint ventures or strategic alliances may fail with high 
probability. Several possible explanations were made to describe the causes for such failures. 
Alliances are essentially unstable as both firms strive to cooperate on the condition that they help 
each other in some instances but they remain as rivalries (Kogut 1989). If the purpose of the alliance 
is just limited to the learning from each other, all parties compete for knowledge acquisitions and 
tend to take opportunistic behaviors (Khanna, Gulati & Nohria 1998). Therefore, they have to take 
higher priority for trust building at the beginning of the formation stage. Such trust is also influenced 
by the national and organizational cultures of each party (Hofstede 1980). A research on cross-border 
alliance implies several important facts for creating successful partnerships. The firms involved 
within the alliance are preferred to be competitive, in a leader or at least in a good position in the 
market, and to have autonomy and flexibility for management process in all organizations (Bleeke & 
Ernst 1991). Although it is still controversial, the firms are desired to have equal amounts of 
ownerships so that both firms would be interested in long term success.  
From the resource-based point of view, firms obtain sustained competitive advantages by 
implementing strategies that exploit their internal strength, though it is hard to define and measure 
the resources (Barney 1991). If firms apply foreign direct investment as the consequence of strategic 
asset seeking by utilizing domestic based resources and capabilities that they are absolutely 
confident enough, they tend to enter the foreign market individually to avoid opportunism-related 
conflicts and increase of transaction cost (Conner & Prahalad 1996). Nevertheless, alliances were 
historically applied as a complementary function of a global strategy, and in some industries, these 
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alliance constellations had influential power for the whole market (Gomes-Casseres 2003). Many 
foreign firms entering developing countries preferred to make an alliance or form a joint venture 
with local firm(s) to acquire knowledge in uncertain environmental markets. In exchange, local 
partners would like to acquire advanced technology, management techniques and knowledge of 
international markets. Regulations of foreign capital cause the firms to select specific entry mode. In 
the public sectors in emerging markets like India and Brazil, foreign firms were often forced to form 
a joint venture. For a successful alliance in an emerging market, foreign firms should understand the 
demands from each party in surrounded legal and institutional environments (Young et al. 2011). As 
mentioned before, lobbying activities to both home and local governments are powerful tools so that 
local personnel having direct connections to the key governmental institutions are advantageous.  
Recently, Japanese trading firms aggressively participating in many global infrastructure 
projects, particularly in independent power plants. This is the consequence as the soft infrastructure 
at home country were developed, especially project finance by institutions such as JBIC, Japan Bank 
for International Cooperation, and other major banks. These trading firms are taking an important 
role at a position of project management, controlling the entire value chain activities as BOT 
contractors (see Figure 1). Intense competition in the domestic retail sector due to saturated 
domestic market changed their attitude towards overseas business. By utilizing their global networks 
built over decades, they are actively employing locals and provide autonomy to local branches for 
rapid response to local needs. Under competitive pressure, such a progressive shift in corporate 
strategic objective reflecting firms’ motivation for operating internationally can also be found in 
other industries (Malnight 1995). Although it is still far to be major competitive players in global 
infrastructure business, these trading firms are willing to take both high profitability and risks by 
managing the whole project and taking the initiatives of allied groups. 
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The statement and argument above leads to the following hypotheses (refer to Figure 4).  
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): If firms collaborate with other firms, they are more likely to receive project 
awards. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): If firms collaborate with foreign firms, they are more likely to receive project 
awards by forming alliances with local firms. 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): If firms collaborate with Japanese firms, they are more likely to receive project 
awards by forming alliances with Japanese trading companies. 
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
Section 1. DATA ACQUISITION & PROCESS 
This section describes the origin of acquired data and provides statements of key assumptions 
made in order to facilitate the statistical approach in this study. Then it describes the process applied 
to acquired data in order to implement statistical analysis. Three important assumptions are stated in 
order to implement the analysis. 
The objective of this analysis is to estimate the potential factors and their effectiveness 
resulting successful project awards. Therefore, the dependent variable is award, the number of 
project awards for certain firms. Required control variables are indicators of activities in overseas 
markets, financial performance at home countries etc. Annually published “Plant Export Data Book” 
by The Heavy & Chemical Industries News Agency contains the table of projects awarded by 
Japanese firms in different infrastructure sectors, for example, transports, power etc. Information of 
each project consists of the country of the project site, types of contracts, prices of contracts if 
available, and names of awarded firms if disclosed. The numbers of total projects awarded to 
Japanese firms in the global petrochemical industry are 51 in 2009, 54 in 2010, 76 in 2011, 79 in 
2012 and 73 in 2013 (The Heavy & Chemical Industries News Agency 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 & 
2014). In this study, 47 firms were selected as those firms awarded more than one project within five 
year data span, so each firm would appear at least once. Therefore the dependent variable award is 
always positive integer such that it appears as 0, 1, 2, 3 … 
Because of the characteristics of the international bidding, materials disclosed to public 
contain only information about the successful bidder. Some key information such as the number of 
other participants those who have lost the bid, prices of their bids, reason of the failure, and names of 
their partners are not disclosed. Here for further analysis requires an important assumption for such 
blinded competitions. The assumption is that the competitiveness of each international bid in a 
particular country in a particular year is equivalent to the condition as if, instead of other firms not 
disclosed, all other Japanese firms have entered into the same global competition in that country in 
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that year. This also implies another assumption which is that the firm’s policy for making alliances 
with other firms was unchanged through the entire five years data span. For an example, if a firm has 
a policy willing to collaborate with foreign firms, its policy remains the same between 2009 and 
2013. Therefore, the data span from 2009 to 2013 was intentionally selected. From the resource 
based point of view, firm gain the competitive advantage by pursuing policy, accumulating 
experience and obtaining the efficiency in the long run (Teece et al. 1997). It is certain that many 
Japanese firms became willing to enter overseas markets after the global financial crisis in 2008. 
Some firms have awarded more than one project through the entire five years data span, 
logistic regression seems to be inappropriate. Applied method is called negative binomial regression, 
which is a generalized Poisson regression, and is particularly useful for data with discrete variables. 
According to the statement made by the Institute for Digital Research and Education of UCLA 
(USA), the condition for use is when the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean. A 
similar guideline is also recommended by other statistical software researchers (Zeileis et al. 2008). 
Here the dependent variable is the number of awards won by certain firms in a certain country in a 
certain year. Because these numbers are count data, which are non-negative integer values with 
maximum number of 13 through the whole data, it is feasible to apply negative binomial regression 
test because the assumption of the Poisson model is no longer valid as the range of count is limited. 
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Section 2. DATA DESCRIPTION FOR HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
The hypotheses are tested using the independent variables as follows: To test Hypothesis 1 
(If firms are more localized in terms of human resources, they are more likely to receive project 
awards), we construct local_expat_r (the ratio of numbers of local employees to expatriates) and 
local_emp_r (the ratio of numbers of local employees to employees at home country). We expect 
that those two variables have positive coefficients. To test Hypothesis 2 (If firms have longer local 
activities, they are more likely to receive project awards), we construct exp_year (experience of 
years since the branch offices or subsidiaries established).  We expect that the variable has a positive 
coefficient. To test Hypothesis 3 (To some extent, if firms establish more regional branches, they are 
more likely to receive project awards), we construct num_country (the number of countries the firm 
has established branches), num_office (the number of branch offices the firm has established) and 
off_country_r (the ratio of number of country markets entered to number of branch offices). We 
expect that those three variables have positive coefficients. The data source for these independent 
variables is “The Advance of Japanese Firms into Foreign Markets” published by Toyo Keizai Data 
Bank which contains organizational structure of overseas offices of Japanese firms. Information 
contains numbers of branches in entered countries, numbers of local employees and expatriates, 
established years and the rates of capital fund (Toyo Keizai Data Bank 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 & 
2013). To test Hypothesis 4 (If firms have a high ratio of foreign to domestic revenues, they are 
more likely to receive the project awards), we construct foreign_r (the ratio of export revenue to total 
revenue). We expect that the variable has a positive coefficient. The data source for foreign_r is 
“Nikkei NEEDS Database” which is a database available online managed by Nikkei Media 
Marketing, INC. Some key financial statements of firms can be found and these include domestic 
total revenue, marginal profit, overseas total revenue, numbers of employees at home countries, and 
capital (Nikkei Media Marketing, INC. 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 & 2013). These hypothesis tests 
should provide some implications to RQ 1 regarding the localization process how the ratio of 
number of local employees, expatriates and employees at home country influence the number of 
successful project awards. These hypothesis tests should also provide some implications to RQ 2 
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regarding how aggressiveness of the globalization process (relative size of overseas markets to the 
home market) influences the number of successful project awards. 
To test Hypothesis 5 (If firms collaborate with other firms, they are more likely to receive 
project awards.), we construct indiv_r (the ratio of awards without strategic alliances to all winning 
awards). We expect that the variable has a negative coefficient. To test Hypothesis 6 (If firms 
collaborate with foreign firms, they are more likely to receive project awards by forming alliances 
with local firms), we construct local_r (the ratio of awards with strategic alliances with local foreign 
firms to all winning awards). We expect that the variable has a positive coefficient.  To test 
Hypothesis 7 (If firms collaborate with Japanese firms, they are more likely to receive project 
awards by forming alliances with Japanese trading companies), we construct trade_r (the ratio of 
awards with strategic alliances with Japanese trading firms to all winning awards). We expect that 
the variable has a positive coefficient. The data source for these independent variables is Plant 
Export Data Book. These three hypothesis tests should provide some implications to RQ 3 regarding 
how the selection of strategic alliance partners influences the number of successful project awards. 
Moreover, we have several control variables such as sales (total revenue), profitability (the 
ratio of marginal profit to total revenue), employee (the number of employees at home country), and 
year dummy. 
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS & IMPLICATIONS 
The result of correlation analysis of all variables stated in the previous chapter is shown in 
Table 3. This indicates that there is no significant co-linearity among selected control variables 
against the dependent variable (DV) award, the number of project awards for certain firms. The 
outcome of the statistical (negative binomial regression) analysis is summarized in the result table 
(see Table 4). Each row represents the coefficients of selected control variables with standard error 
in the brackets. Each column represents a test (1) to (12) described in the previous chapter. 
Implications of results are also described in this section and they are stated with an explanation of 
the hypotheses made previously. 
Column (1) does not indicate a positive and statistically significant value for the localization 
parameter local_expat_r (the ratio of numbers of local employees to expatriates). Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
- the effect of localization process to successful project awards - is not evidently supported. This 
implies that in terms of the ratio of numbers of local employees to expatriates, localization is not a 
significant factor for firms to get project awards successfully. Column (2) also does not indicate a 
positive and statistically significant value for another localization parameter local_emp_r (the ratio 
of numbers of local employees to employees at home country). Again H1 is not evidently supported. 
This implies that in terms of the ratio of employees at home country to local employees, localization 
is not a significant factor for firms to get project awards successfully. 
Column (3) indicates a positive and statistically significant value for exp_year (experience of 
years since the branch offices or subsidiaries established). Hypothesis 2 (H2) - the effect of time 
length of local activities to successful project award - is evidently supported. This implies that if 
overseas branches or subsidiaries have longer history after establishment, they are more likely to be 
successful. 
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Column (4) indicates a positive and statistically significant value for the first variable for 
regional diversification num_country (the number of countries the firm has established branches). 
This implies that it is important for firms to enter local countries and establish braches to win the 
awards. It also implicitly indicates that establishing braches for direct communication with local 
governments and local national enterprises may be supportive for project winnings. Column (5) 
indicates a positive and statistically significant value for the second variable for regional 
diversification num_office (the number of branch offices the firm has established). This implies that 
it is important for firms to establish more branches abroad to win project awards. More branches 
offices simply mean the firm could gather more local market and project information. Column (6) 
indicates a negative and statistically significant value for the third variable for regional 
diversification off_country_r (the ratio of number of country markets entered to number of branch 
offices). This implies that it is important for firms to avoid high degree of geographical 
concentration when establishing branches. Together with columns (4), (5) & (6), Hypothesis 3 (H3) 
- the effect of regional diversification of local activities to successful project awards - is evidently 
supported. This implies that in order to win project awards, firms should enter the local market and 
establish their own branch offices to some extents. If the firm has too many branch offices in one 
local market, it does not lead to successful winning of project awards. Thus regional diversification 
strategy is important in the global petrochemical industry. 
Column (7) indicates a positive and statistically significant value for exp_year (experience of 
years since the branch offices or subsidiaries established) and foreign_r (the ratio of export revenue 
to total revenue). Hypothesis 4 (H4) - the effect of firm’s aggressiveness of entering overseas 
markets to successful project awards - is evidently supported. This implies that if the financial 
performance of the firm is high at its home country, the necessity of globalization is small. Therefore 
the firms do not consider overseas market seriously. If the ratio of foreign to domestic sales is high, 
they are more likely to get further project awards successfully. 
Column (8) does not indicate a positive and statistically significant value for one of the 
strategic alliances parameters indiv_r (the ratio of awards without strategic alliances to all winning 
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awards). Hypothesis 5 (H5) - the effect of entering overseas markets by forming strategic alliances 
with other firms to successful project awards - is evidently supported. This implies that entering 
overseas markets on their own does not lead to success of getting project awards, although the 
evidence is not significant. 
Column (9) indicates a positive and statistically significant value for other two strategic 
alliances parameters local_r (the ratio of awards with strategic alliances with local foreign firms to 
all winning awards) and nonlocal_r (the ratio of awards with strategic alliances with non-local 
foreign firms to all winning awards). Hypothesis 6 (H6) - the effect of entering overseas markets by 
forming strategic alliances with foreign firms to successful project awards - is evidently supported. 
This implies that, together with strategic alliances with foreign firms, firms are more likely to get 
project awards successfully by forming alliances with both local and non-local firms. In this case, 
alliance with local firms is better as it shows higher statistical significance. 
Column (11) indicates a positive and statistically significant value for other strategic 
alliances parameters nontrade_r (the ratio of awards with strategic alliances with Japanese 
non-trading firms to all winning awards), but does not indicate a positive and statistically significant 
value for trade_r (the ratio of awards with strategic alliances with Japanese trading firms to all 
winning awards). Hypothesis 7 (H7) - the effect of entering overseas markets by forming strategic 
alliances with Japanese firms to successful project awards - is partially supported as nontrade_r is 
statistically significant whereas trade_r is not. This implies that, together with strategic alliances 
with Japanese firms, firms are more likely to get project awards successfully if the alliances 
complement the different parts of value chain activities. In contrast, it is not successful when allied 
with Japanese trading firms. Column (12) indicates a positive and statistically significant value for 
all strategic alliances parameters, but it is not as significant as seen in column (11). Again, H6 is 
partially supported. This implies that, compared to entering overseas markets on their own, firms are 
more likely to get project awards successfully by forming strategic alliances with firms that are 
active on different parts of value chain, and even better when collaborating with local firms. 
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION 
The implications stated in the previous chapter can be described as simple concepts. Firms 
should have a clear globalization strategy in terms of regional strategy. In this study, in 
petrochemical industry in particular, localization process in terms of human resources is not 
important. Firms should have domestic based resources and capabilities to succeed in the global 
market but aggressiveness is more important. If firms lack some parts of resources and capabilities 
for executing particular projects, forming alliances with appropriate partners leads to winning 
successful project awards. 
Regarding the results from (1) to (6), where H1 is rejected and H2 & H3 are evidently 
supported, there are some developed ideas of business-to-business marketing strategy that may 
explain, in terms of human resources, why regional diversification strategy is important whereas 
localization process is not. As the analytical result indicates, accumulated historical experience of 
local branches is important, especially when dealing with customized products and services in 
business-to-business marketing. Firms may consider investing in local markets strategically in 
advance to build long term relationships with purchasers rather than being interested in short term 
profit. For example, firms may have flexible production process, logistics, servicing, and they may 
rapidly respond to some modifications at any time, by establishing local offices adjacent to the 
customer’s head office (Boston Consulting Group 2005). This is indeed true and often seen in 
petrochemical industry. However, the localization process may not be so important in such labor 
intensive industries. One of marketing mix, promotion process, in business-to-business marketing is 
not effective. Instead, the reputation or supply record, of firms in the industry indicates the reliability 
of their products or service, and sustaining a confidential relationship with industrial local leaders is 
far more vital.  
With regards to result (7), rejected hypothesis H4, could be explained as misinterpretation of 
the resource based theory. Because the market size of infrastructure business in Japan is large, many 
firms actually possess resources and capabilities. But if these firms do not consider the global 
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markets earnestly, especially those emerging markets, it does not lead to successful project awards. If 
firms have the benefit of the dominant position in lucrative domestic business, they may not consider 
or even hesitate to enter emerging markets with high risks and uncertainties. When a firm is 
successful in domestic market, they pursue more growth in their domestic business that further tends 
to ignore overseas markets creating a vicious cycle. Firms should aggressively invest in business 
opportunities that are long term with high risks when they have affluent financial resources and 
capabilities otherwise when the external environment changes dramatically for some reasons, it may 
be belated to do so. This is a dilemma that firms having sustainable competitive advantage for 
existing businesses would not easily admit further transformation of their current business portfolio. 
Firms with inferior positions in the domestic market to other competitors probably possess neither 
enough resources nor capabilities except aggressiveness as they are forced to become globalized, 
therefore they would consider overseas markets more seriously. Some Japanese firms entered 
emerging markets like Myanmar decades ago, immediately after WWII. In this type of discrete 
customized business, there may be a very effective first mover advantage as they could accumulate 
more knowledge and experiences, and occupy key resources in the local market. 
The results from (9) to (12) are interesting, where H5 and H6 are supported and H7 is 
partially supported. The role of trading firms is similar to orchestration in some sense. In terms of 
knowledge acquisition, brand management, relationship enforcement and activating organizations, 
strategic alliances having forms of orchestration are common in technology intensive industries 
where the orchestrator is willing to accept greater risks of overall project. This type of alliance may 
be considered in certain situations when firms have a lack of capability, when the firms enter 
inexperienced businesses or markets, when firms do not intend to invest their time and effort to build 
required capability etc. (Boston Consulting Group 2006). Historically, the era between 70s and 90s 
was the period of financial stagnation for all Japanese trading firms as many Japanese manufacturing 
firms established their own branch offices and production factories in local markets. Together with 
IT revolution, it brought the concept of eliminating the middlemen. Therefore entries to overseas 
markets no longer become dominated by trading firms. Instead, trading firms evolved by acquiring 
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capabilities of building information networks and market investigation functions. Trading firms 
define themselves as organizers of projects and they may lead the next generation of infrastructure 
maintenance business. This is indeed true that trading firms always played a crucial role of natural 
resource import business. However, from export oriented firm’s perspective, this is questionable. 
Other than technologies applied to petrochemical plants, the complexity of project management 
increased as each project involves whole vertical value chain activities. One of the interesting 
characteristics of trading firms nowadays is that they focus on short term strategy and profit. They 
usually attempt to optimize their business portfolio and sometimes radical change occurs even within 
one year (Japanese Foreign Trade Council, Inc. 2014). This is a completely different attitude from 
those infrastructure exporters who would like to build long term relationships with all participating 
parties. By utilizing built networks, trading firms may possess more power under the name of 
consortiums or joint venture projects. Perhaps knowledge diffusion between these parties is 
restricted substantially and it could only occur one way whereby information flows from all other 
parties to the trading firm. Therefore it may not be beneficial for all other infrastructure exporters as 
they lose all leaning opportunities of project management in wide scope. Yet, the trading firms want 
to minimize the risks, so there is a clear misalignment between these parties. There are many books 
and papers published by the Japanese Foreign Trade Council, Inc. (JFTC), which mostly consists of 
people originated from trading firms. Therefore they insist on the necessity of trading firms for 
exporting infrastructure business to overseas markets. This insistence could somewhat be perceived 
as self-evaluated and self-praised and it remains dubious. 
This study revealed that some relationships between successful project awards and some 
potential factors attribute to firms own specifications. There are three practical implications for 
existing firms in petrochemical industry. First, firms must have long term perspective and should not 
expect dramatic increase in sales or profit by simply entering into existing markets. Historically, 
Japanese construction firms were always forced to enter the global market by external factors in 
which they gained opportunity to acquire all necessary skills, know-how, local knowledge and 
building relationship with local governments. Such a great undertaking cannot be accomplished 
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overnight. Firms should also be aware of potential changes in the market and prepare entry processes 
to local market in advance if required. Second, in this labor intensive industry, firms should 
understand that globalization strategies can always be considered by relative evaluation of the 
domestic market and the capabilities firm possesses. Without firms making a commitment to enter 
the global market, the consequence is miserable. Third, no matter if the firms do have enough 
resources and capabilities to execute all globalization process by themselves or not, firm should not 
enter local markets on their own and should avoid taking all risks by selecting appropriate partners. 
Forming strategic alliances with other parties having common interests create mutual learning 
opportunities.  
This study also revealed some implications for academic side that has to be scrutinized. First, 
the limitation of the assumptions has to be examined. The assumption, blinded competitions, is 
debatable and there are no evidences supporting this assumption. Firms may not enter as much 
competitions as assumed. Any statistical approach complementing this assumption may be greatly 
supportive. As discussed in section 2-3, since the global petrochemical industry has a tendency of 
converging towards a certain global standards, it was reasonable to assume that the complexity of 
each project is equivalent to each other, hence the work and effort required to awarded projects is 
also equivalent to each other. But it is not sure whether a similar concept of assumption is applicable 
in other sectors. Regarding firm’s policy, analyzed data only covers five years data span and this can 
be extended. In such a case, the data range has to be sufficiently long enough, for example twenty 
years data span, to break down into the behavioral analysis of each firm along the timeline, 
investigating how each firm made the decision of strategic alliance with different types of partners. 
Otherwise the assumption is violated and it can no longer be meaningful analysis. Second, the 
validity of the data has to be tested. One of the control variable used to examine hypothesis 
regarding firm’s diversification strategy, the acquired data included the number of countries the firm 
has established branches and the number of branch offices the firm has established. This may have a 
biased perspective and selecting such indicator could be inappropriate. In practice, firms tend to 
establish local branches in countries close to their home country and if firms strategically consider 
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them as important locations through their value chain activities, firms indeed would establish more 
branches depending on geographical dispersion in each country. In this particular study, Japanese 
firms usually have several branches in China. Third, the possibility of applying similar method to 
other field has to be studied. The scope of work may be expanded to other related industry such as 
power plant, railways and other transport sectors, however, there also require other significant 
assumptions. Researchers should be aware of validity and constrained application of assumptions 
used in this study. Perhaps it may be feasible to apply a similar statistical method to the power sector 
where facilities of the power plants are relatively modularized so that regarding complexity of 
projects may be applicable. Sustainability of firm’s policy, may also be applicable. The power sector 
is interrelated with other energy sectors and firms usually require long term investment. Thus, there 
could be several potentials to investigate in different sectors. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
The main finding of this study is that, in petrochemical industry, Japanese firms may have 
better ability to win project awards if they have clear long term regional strategies and consider the 
overseas markets seriously. Localization in terms of human resources is not so important as widely 
believed. If firms do not have resources and capabilities to deal with the entire project, rather than 
bravely undertake the problems on their own, it is better to form strategic alliances with others in the 
same field. However, the study could not reveal any evidences showing that trading firms are 
predominantly supportive for other Japanese firms to make alliances with. In this globalized industry, 
Japanese firms should understand the effective way to enter overseas markets and leverage the 
resources, capabilities and technologies they have accumulated over the past decades to be 
competitive, and cooperate with each other when necessary. 
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